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Abstract—Secret passwords are very widely used for user
authentication to websites, despite their known shortcomings.
Most websites using passwords also implement password recovery
to allow users to re-establish a shared secret if the existing value
is forgotten; many such systems involve sending a password
recovery email to the user, e.g. containing a secret link. The
security of password recovery, and hence the entire user-website
relationship, depends on the email being acted upon correctly;
unfortunately, as we show, such emails are not always designed to
maximise security and can introduce vulnerabilities into recovery.
To understand better this serious practical security problem, we
surveyed password recovery emails for 50 of the top English
language websites. We investigated a range of security and
usability issues for such emails, covering their design, structure
and content (including the nature of the user instructions), the
techniques used to recover the password, and variations in email
content from one web service to another. Many well-known web
services, including Facebook, Dropbox, and Microsoft, suffer
from recovery email design, structure and content issues. This
is, to our knowledge, the first study of its type reported in
the literature. This study has enabled us to formulate a set of
recommendations for the design of such emails.
Index Terms—password recovery, email-based password recov-
ery, content and design of email-based password recovery.
I. INTRODUCTION
Password-based authentication is widely used; 90% of the
1000 most-visited websites authenticate users with a tex-
tual password [1]. Users will often have dozens of user-
name/password pairs to remember, a very challenging re-
quirement. As a result, users commonly forget or mislay
passwords. Thus websites typically offer a password recovery
system to allow legitimate users to recover account access by
redistributing the old password or creating a new one.
Websites often offer multiple password recovery options,
e.g. based on security questions, a registered email address, or
a mobile number. Email-based password recovery is widely
implemented [2], [3], and is likely to remain in wide use for
years to come. In a typical such system, when a user initiates
password recovery a password recovery email is sent to the
user’s registered email address. The recovery email, see e.g.
Figure 1, will typically contain instructions on how to recover
the password; these instructions might include clicking on a
link or entering a verification code or temporary password.
Since email-based password recovery is widely used, it
is important to understand whether it is secure in practice.
Unfortunately, as we show, some recovery emails are not well-
designed and can introduce vulnerabilities into the recovery
process. In this paper, we analyse password recovery emails
by examining their content and design, and use this analysis
to make recommendations regarding their design. To our
knowledge there are no published studies on the design of
recovery emails, despite the potential of poor design to give
rise to serious vulnerabilities. This observation has motivated
the work described here.
To understand better the size and nature of this serious
practical security problem, we manually surveyed password
recovery emails for 50 of the top English language websites1.
The study examined the content of recovery emails and
evaluated their security and usability, including: their ease of
use, their overall design, the clarity of instructions, and the
techniques used to recover the password.
The paper is structured as follows. Section II is a review
of previous work on password recovery and email-based pass-
word recovery. In section III we review the use of password
recovery emails; Section IV then reviews the risks associated
with email-based password recovery, which forms the basis
for our subsequent analysis. Section V gives the scope and
methodology for the study, and Section VI provides the main
findings from our survey. In Section VII we use these findings
to provide recommendations on the design of email-based
password recovery. Section VIII concludes the paper, including
a discussion of possible directions for further research.
II. PREVIOUS WORK
Bonneau et al. [2] examined 150 web sites which offer
free services and found that 92% of them offer email-based
password recovery. This means that ensuring the recovery
emails are well-designed is of great practical importance for
security. A number of authors have examined issues relating
to email-based web password recovery. In 2003, Garfinkel [3]
discussed email-based identification and authentication and
described ways of improving its security. More recently, Al
Maqbali and Mitchell [4] discussed the security issues arising
from the password recovery process, including from the use of
emails, although they did not focus on the design of the emails
themselves. Specific aspects of password recovery systems,
notably the design and use of Short Message Service (SMS)-
based password recovery, were examined by Gelernter et al.
[5], who observed serious vulnerabilities arising from poor
1The list was taken from https://majestic.com/reports/majestic-million.978-1-5386-7931-9/18/$31.00 c© 2018 IEEE
design of such SMSs. Just as in SMS-based recovery, the use
of emails for password recovery has inherent problems, [4],
[6]. E.g., the email may fall into the wrong hands if the email
address used is no longer correct. However, our main concern
here is how the design of recovery emails can affect security.
III. PASSWORD RECOVERY EMAILS
A. Use of recovery emails
Email-based password recovery (see, for example, [4])
involves an email being sent to the user by the web service;
this email contains a secret which, on the assumption that the
email can only reach the intended user, is used to authorise
the password recovery request. The email may also contain
information which helps the user to reset their password at the
website. These emails vary in content and design, although in
all cases it is vital that the email is not available to third parties
who could use the secret in the email to hijack the recovery
process. Given that correct use of the email by its recipient is
security-critical, the content and design of the email are clearly
of importance in practice, since they will affect how the email
is treated by the user.
Figure 1 shows a Dropbox password recovery email. Such
emails typically include a user greeting, the email purpose,
instructions (possibly including what to do if the user did
not request recovery), and contact details. The instructions
will include a (one-time-secret) mechanism enabling password
recovery, e.g. a URL (link) or code/temporary password.
Clicking on such a link redirects the browser to a page
enabling the user to set up a new password. Verification
codes/temporary passwords typically give temporary access to
a user account purely to establish a new password, e.g. as used
by Amazon and Wikipedia.
Fig. 1. Example password recovery email (from dropbox.com)
B. Email structure
In general, emails can be divided into header and body [7];
however, for our purposes we further divide password recovery
emails into four components: the email preheader, email
header, email body and email signature (where preheader and
signature are parts of the body), as follows.
• Email preheader (Johnson Box2 or Snippet). This
corresponds to the first few words of an email, the exact
length being determined by the email client. Figure 2
shows examples of Gmail preheaders. It is typically
displayed by the email client after the subject header field
(see below), to give the recipient an idea of what the
email is about3. Despite its variability across clients, we
discuss below the importance of the preheader in ensuring
that emails are handled appropriately by their recipients.
Given the small number of clients in widespread use, it is
relatively easy for email senders to check the appearance
of the preheader for the vast majority of users.
Fig. 2. Message preheader example
• Email header. The header can only contain printable US-
ASCII characters (except for carriage return, line feed,
and colon), [7], and contains message metadata. It is
broken into fields, each starting with a name followed
by a colon (:). Examples of key header fields are briefly
described below; many of these fields are displayed by
the email client, along with the body of the message.
– The subject field is chosen by the sender, and is
commonly used to give a summary of the email.
– The to and from fields contain the email addresses of
the sender and recipient, as specified by the sender.
– The orig-date indicates when the email was sent.
– The message-ID is a globally unique email identi-
fier, [8], [7].
Email clients will typically display the subject, to, from
and orig-date fields in lists of received emails; other
header fields, e.g. the message-ID, are typically optionally
viewable. For example, the Gmail show original button
will reveal the entire email header.
• Email body. This constitutes the contents of the email.
Email bodies were originally simply text strings, but
MIME [9] allows bodies in a range of formats and
with multiple parts. Today many email bodies contain
an HTML-formatted part, which is by default what is
displayed; this is thus the most important part for our
analysis, and we look in detail at the information included
in recovery email bodies below.
• Email signature. This is included at the end of the email
body in a format determined by the sender’s email client
and the user. Its purpose is to provide information about
the sender in an accessible form.
2http://hyperlinkcode.com/blog/html-johnson-box/
3The term ‘preheader’ is perhaps misleading since it is displayed after the
subject header field, and actually occurs in the email after the header.
C. Email client features
A range of email information can be displayed by an email
client, some of which is computed by the client rather than
being contained in the email itself. Examples of information
of this latter type include the following.
• Sender Policy Framework (SPF) [10] is an email-
validation system designed to detect and block email
spoofing. It allows receiving email exchangers to check
that an incoming email from a domain comes from a host
authorized by that domain’s administrators.
• DomainKeys Identified Mail (DKIM) [11] aims to
prevent email spoofing by allowing the receiver to check
that an email claiming to have come from a domain was
authorized by the owner of that domain.
• Domain-based Message Authentication, Reporting
and Conformance (DMARC) [12] is an email-validation
system designed to combat certain techniques often used
in phishing and email spam, such as emails with forged
sender addresses (in the from field) appearing to originate
from legitimate organizations.
IV. RISKS FROM RECOVERY EMAILS
We next review threats that can arise from poorly designed
recovery emails. Of course, the use of email in password
recovery has intrinsic risks (see, e.g., [4]), but we do not
discuss them here. The list below was compiled by combining
the discussion of design of the password recovery SMSs due
to Gelernter et al. [5], with our own observations derived from
our study.
• Poor instructions. It is important that the user is given
clear instructions on how to use the email, and an
indication of its sensitivity. Some emails give very brief
instructions, e.g. limited to what the user should do to
proceed, whereas others give almost too much informa-
tion and are very hard to follow; this can be challenging,
especially for non-technical users. Most seriously, the
lack of clear instructions could lead to disclosure of the
secret in the email, e.g. by forwarding the email to a third
party, thus compromising password recovery.
• Poor readability. Some HTML-formatted emails use
small fonts and/or small buttons, which can make reading
them hard especially for those with impaired vision.
• Lack of easily recognized source. Some recovery emails
lack clear information as to their source, e.g. a usable
email address; in such cases the user may treat it as a
phishing email or it may be blocked by a spam filter.
• Email header or preheader leaking confidential in-
formation. In some cases the temporary password or
validation code is included in the header or preheader,
which means that it might be available to anyone with
temporary access to the phone, even if locked.
• Lack of contact details. Some emails lack contact details
for use if the recovery process fails. Contact details are
often necessary as the source email address may not be
monitored for replies.
• Lack of instructions if recovery not requested. Re-
covery emails may lack instructions on what to do if
password recovery was not requested, e.g. indicating an
attempt to gain unauthorized access to the account.
• Spam filter issues. If the email is not constructed care-
fully, then there is an increased danger that it will be
blocked by a spam filter [3], hence preventing the user
from performing password recovery.
V. A STUDY OF EXISTING PRACTICE
A. Scope of study
We examined 50 widely used English language sites. We
looked at only 50 websites because we needed to manually
register at each site, trigger a recovery email, and then care-
fully examine it. The average time to perform the first two
steps was 20 minutes, and so it took around 17 hours simply
to gather the data. The process could not be automated since
user registration and password recovery requests require user
interactions, e.g. solving a CAPTCHA or validating the email
address by clicking on a link or entering a temporary code.
We chose the 50 highest-ranking sites employing email-
based password recovery from the list of most-visited websites
provided by majestic.com (chosen because it offers informa-
tion free of charge). In a number of cases, we were not able to
study a web site on the list; if so we simply moved on to the
next site in the list, continuing until we had the results from
50 sites. Sites were omitted from our study if they did not
offer the ability to create an account, if creating an account
required taking out a subscription, or where an organisation
(e.g. flickr.com and yahoo.com) operated multiple sites where
we skipped second and subsequent related sites.
B. Methodology
We performed the following three steps with each of the
50 chosen websites. Account creation/registration involved
giving a user name, password, and any other information
requested. We initiated password recovery by making a
password recovery request and recorded the received recovery
email. Finally we manually analysed the password recovery
email. In this analysis we first examined each email against the
design risks listed in section IV, and in each case considered
whether the email suffered from the risk. This generated the
statistical results given in section VI-A below. We then looked
at each of the four components of the email and noted any
examples of particularly good or bad practice; the results of
this examination are summarised in sections VI-B–VI-D.
VI. RESULTS
A. Summary of risks
As described above, we start by summarising the observed
frequency of the seven risk types given in section IV.
• Poor instructions. As many as 22 (44%) of the 50
emails contained no further instructions on the use of the
provided link or code, as was the case for tumblr.com.
• Poor readability. Three (6%) of the emails used small
fonts or condensed blocks of text, giving potential read-
ability issues, e.g. www.ncbi.nlm.hih.gov.
• Lack of easily recognised source. In five (10%) of
the cases, the from field contained an email address
with no obvious link to the originating website making
recognition problematic, e.g. dailymail.co.uk uses pass-
word@and.co.uk.
• Email header or preheader leaking confidential infor-
mation. Only six of the 50 emails contained a secret
code/temporary password; the others used a link or a
combination of code and link; of these six, two (4%)
leaked the code via the header or preheader field. These
two websites are two of the most widely used sites,
i.e. google.com leaked the code via the preheader and
facebook.com included the code in the header.
• Lack of contact details. As many as 35 (70%) of the
recovery emails did not provide any contact details, e.g.
for use in the event of problems, although some of these
(e.g. pinterest.com) provided links to web sites for further
information (e.g. containing FAQs).
• Lack of instructions if recovery was not requested.
20 (40%) of the emails, including that from google.com,
failed to provide any user guidance for the case where
the recovery email was not requested.
• Spam filter issues. In our experiment, two (4%) of the
emails were routed into a spam folder by the email client,
e.g. the email from creativecommons.org. This suggests
that the source of these emails could have done more to
prevent such an undesirable event.
All 50 of the emails suffered from at least two of the above
issues. This suggests that most websites need to improve the
design of their recovery emails. Although some the identified
issues seem minor, even if they cause a problem in just 1%
of recovery attempts this could potentially result in a large
number of compromised or unusable accounts.
B. Email header
We focussed on the subject and from fields.
1) subject: Among the websites we tested, Facebook (see
Figs. 2 and 3) was the only one which included a verification
code in the subject field. An email client may display the
subject fields of received emails even when a phone is locked,
increasing the risk that the code will be seen by a third party.
2) from: This field includes an email address and, option-
ally, a ‘name’.
• If the sender name is absent then the receiver might doubt
its legitimacy. Six of the 50 emails did not state the name
of the sender in this field, e.g. the www.ibm.com recovery
email had from field ‘ibmacct@us.ibm.com’, i.e. without
the name of the service. Similar issues arise in SMS-
based password recovery [5].
• In some cases, the email address did not identify the
type of service, i.e. relating to password recovery, e.g.
no-reply@tumblr.com.
• Of the 50 recovery emails we examined, 21 (i.e. 42%)
were sent from an email address to which replies are not
permitted (e.g. noreply@bloomberg.com). Other websites
did not use noreply but emails to the address bounced, e.g.
washingtonpost.com. If a contact email is not provided
then this is very unhelpful for users who encounter
difficulties; it could also mean that the recovery email
is blocked by an email client spam filter.
• Some emails were not constructed in such a way as to
pass the SPF, DKIM and DMARC anti-spoofing tests,
e.g. ibm.com failed DMARC testing.
Fig. 3. Facebook password recovery email
C. Message body
28 of the emails contained a personalised user greeting
(e.g. a name or email address), whereas others had a generic
greeting or none at all. A personalised greeting is to be
preferred since it helps reassure the user the email is genuine.
Information as to when the request was initiated was included
in three of the recovery emails we examined; this helps the
user verify that the email corresponds to a legitimate request.
46 of the 50 emails included a URL link for password
recovery. We have a number of observations.
• 41 (82%) of the emails did not specify how long the
URL would remain valid. As discussed elsewhere [4],
it is desirable for links to have a short lifetime, since
they represent a security risk. Indeed, some tokens were
sill valid even three months after the experiment, e.g.
creativecommons.org and Bloomberg.com. In other cases
the password recovery page was available after token
expiry, allowing the user to generate a new token without
user authentication, e.g. www.mozilla.org.
• 20 (40%) of the emails did not give a way of disabling
the link in the event of accidental initiation of password
recovery, increasing the risk of compromise.
• Many emails require the user to copy and paste the URL
into a browser, which can expose the user to phishing
attacks. E.g. an attacker could trigger password recovery
for the user, and instruct the user to copy the URL in a
recovery email into an attacker webpage.
Websites give varying advice for the case that the user
did not request recovery. Some, e.g. www.dropbox.com and
www.wix.com simply suggested ignoring the email; this may
leave the user very concerned as to what is happening.
Others suggest contacting the web service, e.g. by filling an
online form, contacting a call centre (e.g. www.nytimes.com),
replying to the email (e.g. www.vimeo.com), or clicking on
a link (e.g. Facebook.com). Other sites, e.g. www.forbes.com,
did not address the issue at all.
47 (94%) of the recovery emails failed to advise the user
to protect the code or URL. Giving such a warning can help
to reduce the risk of code sharing and phishing attacks. The
same issue arises when using SMS-based password recovery.
D. Message signature
As many as 21 of the emails lacked a signature, e.g.
www.wikipedia.org/. Other contained only the URL, e.g.
www.microsoft.com and www.dropbox.com.
VII. RECOMMENDATIONS
The issues identified in our survey enable us to make
the following recommendations for the design of recovery
emails. We divide our recommendations under seven headings
corresponding to the risks identified in section IV.
• Instructions. A personal greeting is desirable to increase
user confidence. Where possible the email should include
a clickable URL, and avoid asking the user to copy/paste
the URL. Users should be warned against sharing or
forwarding password recovery emails. More detailed in-
formation should be provided via links to avoid creating
congested, unreadable emails. The recovery mechanism
should have a limited validity period.
• Readability. The message should be easily comprehen-
sible, i.e. the font/font size must be chosen with care.
• Source recognition. The name of the sender and the
sender email address should match.
• Email header and preheader design. The header and
preheader must not include any secret recovery informa-
tion, e.g. a code or link, since preheaders can appear on
a mobile phone screen even when locked. Users may
also be tempted to perform recovery just by reading
the preheader without fully viewing the email, thereby
missing any instructions/warnings in the email. This issue
can be more severe for users who view emails on a mobile
phone, where the preheader can often be a ‘notification’.
Similarly, the subject field in an email header should state
clearly the purpose of the email along with the service
name.
• Contact details. The email should give a valid email
address or a support link for use if the user is unable to
recover a password. Ideally the email signature should
include the name of the web service along with a logo,
an email address, a phone number, a website URL and a
physical address.
• Instructions if recovery not requested. Users should
be given a means to disable the password recovery
mechanism and to report unsolicited recovery emails to
assure users of their security.
• Spam filter issues. The email should be generated and
sent in such a way as to minimise the risk that it is
blocked by a spam filter.
VIII. CONCLUDING REMARKS
We examined the password recovery emails sent by 50
of the most widely visited websites, and found that they all
suffer from at least two types of defect. As a result it seems
likely that some password recovery processes are likely to
be unnecessarily prone to compromise. Although email-based
password recovery allows the service provider to provide clear
and detailed instructions, it would appear that some providers
have given relatively little attention to the design of their
recovery emails. In some cases the email structure, wording
and content clearly give rise to potential vulnerabilities. Our
survey has allowed us to make a series of recommendations
regarding how best a password recovery email should be
designed to maximise security and usability. There is clearly
a need for further research in this important area, as well as
new, more secure, ways of performing password recovery.
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